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      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
 
No. 09-3616 
   
 
CARL SIMON,  
 
                        Appellant 
v. 
 
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
       
 
On Appeal from the District Court  
of the Virgin Islands – Appellate Division 
(D. C. No. 3-03-cv-00024) 
District Judge:  Honorable Daryl D. Donohue   
District Judge:  Honorable Raymond L. Finch 
District Judge:  Honorable Curtis V. Gomez                                     
       
 
Argued on December 8, 2011 
 
Before:  FISHER, GREENAWAY, JR. and ROTH, 
 
Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 9, 2012)                                                       
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Joseph A. DiRuzzo, III, Esquire (Argued) 
Fuerst Ittleman 
1001 Brickell Bay Drive 
Suite 3200 
Miami, FL   33131 
 
   Counsel for Appellant 
 
Office of Attorney General of the Virgin Islands 
Department of Justice 
Tiffany V. Monrose, Esquire (Argued) 
34-38 Kronprindsens Gade, GERS Complex, 2nd Floor 
Charlotte Amalie 
St. Thomas, VI   00802 
 
   Counsel for Appellee 
 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge
Carl Simon appeals the August 6, 2009 order of the 
Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands, 
affirming the July 18, 2002 judgment of the Territorial Court 
of the Virgin Islands, denying post-conviction relief.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will vacate the order of the Appellate 
Division and remand the case for further proceedings. 
: 
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I.  
 A.  The Crime 
BACKGROUND 
 In September 1993, Carl Simon, James Roach, and 
another individual burglarized a house on St. John.  Elroy 
Connor and Daniel Ezekiel, one of whom was an occupant of 
the house, arrived during the burglary.  During an ensuing 
altercation, Ezekiel was shot dead.  The three assailants fled 
the scene with money and other valuables.  Simon and Roach 
were later separately apprehended.   
 
 B.  The Trial 
 On May 25, 1994, a two-count Information was filed 
against Simon in the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands 
that charged premeditated murder, in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 
921 and 922(a)(1), and burglary, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 
444(1).  The Information was subsequently amended, and the 
case proceeded to trial on three counts:  felony murder, in 
violation of 14 V.I.C. § 922(a)(2) (Count I), robbery in the 
first degree, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 1862(2) (Count II), 
and burglary in the third degree, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 
444(1) (Count III).   
 
 Augustin Ayala of the Territorial Public Defender’s 
Office was appointed to represent Simon.  Simon repeatedly 
moved to dismiss Ayala, complaining that Ayala would not 
return his calls or visit him.  In turn, Ayala moved to 
withdraw as counsel, expressing difficulties in representing a 
“hostile client” and concern that Simon was “plotting some 
kind of strategy against me, in that he is going to, at some 
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point or the other, claim ineffective assistance of counsel.”  
The Territorial Court declined to relieve Ayala each time, and 
Simon proceeded to trial with Ayala as counsel.   
 
 The trial began on January 23, 1995.  Roach, who had 
already been separately tried before the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands and convicted of first degree murder, testified 
at trial on behalf of the government.  Roach admitted that he 
had committed perjury at his own trial, explained that he had 
requested to be placed in solitary confinement because of 
death threats by Simon’s brother, and testified that the local 
government had promised him protection.  Roach also stated 
that he had not received any promises from the government 
regarding a reduced sentence in exchange for his testimony 
against Simon.   
 
 Ayala did not give an opening statement, call any 
witnesses, or object to closure of the courtroom during 
closing arguments and jury instructions.  Ayala’s motion for 
dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 was denied.  In 
closing, the government emphasized Roach’s fear of Simon 
and stated that Roach “had nothing to gain by being a snitch.  
He only had something to lose, his life.”  After a two-day 
trial, the jury found Simon guilty on all three counts.   
 
 On February 22, 1995, Simon was sentenced to a term 
of life imprisonment without parole on Count I, seven and a 
half years on Count II, and three and a half years on Count 
III, all to be served concurrently.   
 
 
 C.  Direct Appeal 
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 On February 27, 1995, both Ayala and Simon filed a 
Notice of Appeal to the Appellate Division of the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands.  The Appellate Division affirmed 
Simon’s conviction on August 20, 1997.  On September 22, 
1997, Simon filed a pro se Notice of Appeal to this Court.  
We dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it 
was untimely.   
 
 Meanwhile, on September 1, 1995, a stipulation to 
vacate the first degree murder conviction was filed in Roach’s 
case.  On June 12, 1996, the United States Attorney’s Office 
for the District of the Virgin Islands filed a substantial 
assistance motion for the reduction of Roach’s sentence on 
the basis of his testimony against Simon.  That same day, 
Roach pled guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced 
to twenty years in prison.  
 
 D.  Habeas Petition 
 On February 28, 2000, Simon filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus pursuant to 5 V.I.C. § 1301, with the 
Territorial Court.  It was denied on July 18, 2002.  Simon 
appealed to the Appellate Division, which appointed Beth 
Moss as counsel and issued a briefing schedule on March 5, 
2004, amended July 5, 2005.  On April 14, 2004, Moss 
moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders procedures.  The 
Appellate Division granted the motion and appointed Carolyn 
Hermon-Percell to represent Simon.  On September 29, 2005, 
Hermon-Percell identified seven possible issues for appeal, 
found them to be without arguable merit, and moved to 
withdraw pursuant to Anders. 
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 In September 2007, the Appellate Division, apparently 
sua sponte, remanded the appeal to the Superior Court1 to 
determine whether a Certificate of Probable Cause (CPC) 
should be issued pursuant to V.I. R. App. P. 14(b).2
 
  On 
February 22, 2008, the Superior Court issued a CPC, 
discussing in particular Simon’s claims regarding the 
improper amendment of the Information and alleged Brady 
violation.  The CPC was received by the Appellate Division 
on October 2, 2008.  On August 6, 2009, the Appellate 
Division affirmed the denial of the habeas petition based on 
Hermon-Percell’s Anders brief, which it found “adequate on 
its face,” and granted Hermon-Percell’s motion to withdraw.    
 Simon appealed.  On December 17, 2010, we issued a 
Certificate of Appealability, appointed Joseph A. DiRuzzo, 
III as counsel, and directed the parties to address: 
 
 the question whether the Appellate Division of the 
District Court for the Virgin Islands erred in applying 
the procedures of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967), to assess the motions filed by court-appointed 
counsel to withdraw from representing Simon on post-
conviction appeal.   
 
                                                 
1The Virgin Islands Legislature statutorily changed the 
name of the Territorial Court to the Superior Court, effective 
January 1, 2005.  
 
2Rule 14(b) provides that an appeal of the denial of a 
habeas petition may not proceed in the Appellate Division 
without a CPC. 
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We subsequently denied the government’s motion to dismiss 
the case for lack of jurisdiction and directed the parties to 
address “any and all jurisdiction issues including the 
jurisdictional issue raised by the Government as well as the 
District Court’s jurisdiction following remand.” 
    
 In the meantime, on July 31, 2009, Simon filed another 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 5 V.I.C. § 
1301 with the Superior Court, which denied the petition on 
September 22, 2010.  Simon’s appeal to the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court, for which he is also represented by Joseph A. 
DiRuzzo, III, remains pending.   
 
II.  
A.  Jurisdiction 
DISCUSSION 
 The government contends that we lack jurisdiction 
because the case before us is a split appeal that raises issues 
identical to those raised in the appeal pending before the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court.  Because the appeal of the 
Appellate Division’s August 6, 2009 order is before us in full, 
however, the case before us is not a split appeal within the 
meaning of Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. 
McGinley, 273 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1954) (holding that Court of 
Appeals lacked jurisdiction of a split appeal of an order of a 
three-judge court, the constitutional issue having been 
appealed to the Supreme Court and the discriminatory 
enforcement issue having been appealed to the Court of 
Appeals).   
 
 We raised sua sponte the issue of whether the 
Appellate Division had—and consequently whether we 
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have—jurisdiction over this appeal following the remand 
from the Appellate Division to the Superior Court in 
September 2007.  After the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
was created on January 29, 2007, it assumed jurisdiction over 
all appeals from the Superior Court, except for those “then 
pending” before the District Court.  48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d).  A 
case remains “pending” before the District Court if the 
remand was a record remand, meaning the record was 
returned to the Superior Court for a specific purpose, rather 
than a case remand, meaning the case was returned to the 
Superior Court for all purposes.  See Hypolite v. Virgin 
Islands, S. Ct. Crim. No. 2007-135, 2009 WL 152319, at *3-4 
(V.I. Jan. 21, 2009) (per curiam); see also Martinez v. 
Stridiron, S. Ct. Civ. No. 2011-0014, 2011 WL 1483260, at 
*4-5 (V.I. Mar. 22, 2011) (per curiam) (discussing record 
remands and case remands).    
 
Here, the Appellate Division’s remand to the Superior 
Court was for the specific purpose of determining whether a 
CPC should be issued.  Once the CPC was issued, the 
Appellate Division received the appeal back again under the 
same appeal number.  We conclude, therefore, that the 
remand was a record remand and that the Appellate Division 
kept jurisdiction of the appeal during the remand.  It therefore 
had appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the 
Territorial Court pursuant to 48 U.S.C. §§ 1613a(a) and 
1613a(d).  Accordingly, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c).   
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B.  Anders Procedures 
 Simon contends that the Appellate Division erred by 
applying Anders procedures in the habeas context and by 
affirming the Territorial Court’s denial of his habeas petition.  
We review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for 
clear error.  Pittsburgh League of Young Voters Educ. Fund v. 
Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 653 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 
2011).     
 
 Under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 
counsel may seek to withdraw from representing an indigent 
criminal defendant on appeal if there are no nonfrivolous 
issues to appeal.  United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 
(3d Cir. 2000).  We exercise plenary review to determine 
whether there are any such issues.  See Penson v. Ohio, 488 
U.S. 75, 80-83 & n.6 (1988).  We must determine:  1) 
whether counsel adequately fulfilled the requirements of 
Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a), and 2) whether 
an independent review of the record presents any 
nonfrivolous issues.3
                                                 
3Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) states: 
  United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 
“Where, upon review of the district 
court record, trial counsel is 
persuaded that the appeal presents no 
issue of even arguable merit, trial 
counsel may file a motion to 
withdraw and supporting brief 
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 
493 (1967), which shall be served 
upon the appellant and the United 
States. The United States shall file a 
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316, 319 (3d Cir. 2009).  An appeal on a matter of law is 
frivolous where none of the legal points are arguable on their 
merits.  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 
2001).      
1. The Appellate Division did not err by 
applying Anders procedures in the habeas context 
 
 Simon argues that the Appellate Division erred by 
applying Anders procedures to allow court-appointed 
appellate counsel to withdraw from post-conviction 
representation.  Simon urges this Court to impose a rule that 
would require such an attorney to fully brief the merits of an 
appeal of the denial of a habeas petition, even though there is 
no constitutional right to counsel in the habeas context.  
  
 Anders procedures are meant to protect a defendant’s 
constitutional right to counsel.  See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 
481 U.S. 551, 554-55 (1987).  Because that right exists on 
direct appeal but not in collateral proceedings, Anders 
                                                                                                             
brief in response. Appellant may also 
file a brief in response pro se. After 
all briefs have been filed, the clerk 
will refer the case to a merits panel. 
If the panel agrees that the appeal is 
without merit, it will grant trial 
counsel's Anders motion, and dispose 
of the appeal without appointing new 
counsel. If the panel finds arguable 
merit to the appeal, it will discharge 
current counsel, appoint substitute 
counsel, restore the case to the 
calendar, and order supplemental 
briefing.” 
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procedures are not required in the habeas context.  See id. at 
555, 557 (“Since respondent has no underlying constitutional 
right to appointed counsel in state post-conviction 
proceedings, she has no constitutional right to insist on the 
Anders procedures which were designed solely to protect that 
underlying constitutional right.”).   
 
 Because Anders procedures afford heightened 
protections, however, it is not erroneous to apply them in the 
habeas context.  Indeed, Anders procedures afford the 
petitioner a more careful review of the merits of an appeal 
than might occur without an attorney or with a less than 
conscientious attorney.  Applying Anders procedures in the 
habeas context does not deprive the petitioner of anything that 
he would be given in any other format.  The Appellate 
Division did not, therefore, err by applying Anders 
procedures in the habeas context.   
 
2. The Appellate Division erred by 
finding counsel’s Anders brief sufficient as a matter of law 
 
 Simon contends that the Appellate Division erred by 
affirming the denial of his habeas petition based on Hermon-
Percell’s Anders brief.  We agree.   
 
 When the Superior Court issued the CPC, it noted that 
“although the grounds for granting habeas corpus are quite 
narrow, it appears to the Court that Simon’s amended petition 
for habeas relief was not frivolous.”  In particular, the 
Superior Court discussed Simon’s claims regarding the 
improper amendment of the Information and alleged Brady 
violation and concluded that “these and other issues raised by 
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Simon in his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
are deserving of consideration by the Appellate Division.”   
 
 Yet, in affirming the denial of Simon’s habeas petition, 
the Appellate Division based its analysis on Hermon-Percell’s 
Anders brief, which was filed before the CPC was issued.  
The Appellate Division concluded that Hermon-Percell’s 
Anders brief was “adequate on its face,” confined its review 
to the issues raised therein, and expressly found that the 
issues raised were frivolous.   
 
 In light of the CPD, however, Hermon-Percell’s 
Anders brief was inadequate.  For example, with respect to 
the alleged Brady violation, according to the record, Roach 
was approached by the government to testify against Simon.  
In view of that fact, it was inadequate for Hermon-Percell to 
fail to explore in her Anders brief the issue of whether there 
was a tacit agreement between Roach and the government.  
Moreover, although Roach denied having received any 
promises from the government regarding a reduced sentence 
in exchange for his testimony against Simon, 18 months later 
the U.S. Attorney filed a substantial assistance motion to 
reduce Roach’s sentence.  Even if Hermon-Percell had missed 
these significant facts on her review of the case, once the 
Superior Court issued the CPC, clearly there was arguable 
merit to the appeal.  The Appellate Division should then have 
ordered briefing on the merits – either by Hermon-Percell or 
by substitute counsel, as we would have done pursuant to 
LAR 109.2(a).   
 
 Because there were nonfrivolous issues that the 
Appellate Division should have reviewed on the merits, we 
will vacate the Appellate Division’s order and remand the 
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case to the Appellate Division for appointment of new 
counsel and full briefing and consideration of the merits.  
Issues to be fully briefed on remand should include, but are 
not limited to, the issues discussed in the CPC.  We note that 
Simon has raised other issues before us, such as ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims, that counsel may also choose to 
address upon remand.  We express no view on the merits of 
any of the issues raised.   
 
III.  
 For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the 
order of the Appellate Division and remand the case for 
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
 
